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Abstract
Background: The aim of this paper is to critically discuss some of the ethically controversial issues regarding
continuous deep palliative sedation at the end of life that are addressed in the EAPC recommended framework for
the use of sedation in palliative care.
Discussion: We argue that the EAPC framework would have benefited from taking a clearer stand on the ethically
controversial issues regarding intolerable suffering and refractory symptoms and regarding the relation between
continuous deep palliative sedation at the end of life and euthanasia. It is unclear what constitutes refractory
symptoms and what the relationship is between refractory symptoms and intolerable suffering, which in turn
makes it difficult to determine what are necessary and sufficient criteria for palliative sedation at the end of life,
and why. As regards the difference between palliative sedation at the end of life and so-called slow euthanasia,
the rationale behind stressing the difference is insufficiently demonstrated, e.g. due to an overlooked ambiguity in
the concept of intention. It is therefore unclear when palliative sedation at the end of life amounts to abuse and
why.
Conclusions: The EAPC framework would have benefited from taking a clearer stand on some ethically
controversial issues regarding intolerable suffering and refractory symptoms and regarding the relation between
continuous deep palliative sedation at the end of life and euthanasia. In this text, we identify and discuss these
issues in the hope that an ensuing discussion will clarify the EAPC’s standpoint.
Background
Palliative sedation at the end of life is much debated,
since it involves ethically controversial issues regarding
the good life and death [1], bordering on hotly contested
issues regarding euthanasia and physician assisted sui-
cide. Accordingly, the European Association for Pallia-
tive Care (EAPC) Ethics Task Force emphasised the
need for a broad and continuous discussion of these
questions in 2003 [2]. Recommendations [3,4] and a
forum for discussions http://www.eapcnet.org/forum
have since been presented.
In 2009 the EAPC authorised a recommendation:
EAPC recommended framework for the use of sedation
in palliative care (referred to here as the EAPC frame-
work) [4]. The aim of this paper is to critically discuss
some of its content. Taken as a whole, we think that the
EAPC framework presents excellent procedural guide-
lines for palliative care. It both motivates the importance
of procedural guidelines and pinpoints the key clinical
issues needing to be addressed. However, there are a
couple of ethically controversial issues where we think
that the EAPC framework would have benefited from
clarifying its position to a larger extent. In this text we
identify and discuss these issues in the hope that an
ensuing discussion will clarify the EAPC’s standpoint.
Accordingly, we will focus on the parts of the text that
are relevant to ethically controversial issues in end of
life decisions. More specifically, we will focus on the
themes in the text that are relevant to so-called continu-
ous deep sedation, i.e. continuing to alter patient con-
sciousness without specifically intending to discontinue
sedation [5], when this is done at the end of life. More
specifically still, we think there are two particular
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being more precise: (1) regarding intolerable suffering
and refractory symptoms and (2) regarding the relation
between continuous deep sedation at the end of life and
euthanasia. These issues have been extensively discussed
elsewhere (as regards question (1), see e.g. [6,7]; as
regards question (2) see e.g. [8,9]), which demonstrates
the importance attached to these issues. This in itself
constitutes a reason for further discussion about them.
In the following, we will discuss these questions, tak-
ing as our point of departure what the EAPC framework
has to say about them, and state in what way we think
these issues need to be clarified.
Discussion
Intolerable suffering and refractory symptoms
Intolerable suffering from refractory symptoms is gener-
ally conceived of as an indication for palliative sedation
therapy. According to the EAPC framework, in the
absence of refractory symptoms, the use of palliative
sedation in the end of life is characterised as “abuse":
“This [abuse of palliative sedation] may occur by the
deliberate use of deep sedation in patients who have no
refractory symptoms” (p. 582) [4]. Moreover, the EAPC
framework states that “[c]ontinuous deep sedation
should be selected first if: ...the suffering is indeed
refractory” (p. 586) [4]. In other words, according to the
EAPC framework, the presence of refractory symptoms
is a necessary condition for an ethically defensible initia-
tion of sedation at the end of life, in particular when
there is no intention of discontinuing sedation before
the patient dies. Then it becomes crucial to be able to
determine which symptoms are refractory.
The EAPC framework characterises refractoriness as
“intolerable distress due to physical symptoms, when
there is a lack of other methods for palliation within an
acceptable time frame and without unacceptable adverse
effects” (p. 584) [4]. What should, in turn, be seen as
intolerable distress is not made clear. However, in some
of the texts on which the framework is based, there are
some more precise suggestions. For instance, according
to de Graeff and Dean intolerable suffering is “...deter-
mined by a patient as a symptom or state that he or she
does not wish to endure” (p. 68) [3]. For refractory
symptoms the following definition is used (p. 70, our
emphasis) [3]:
“A symptom is regarded as being refractory (as
opposed to difficult to treat) when the clinician per-
ceives that further invasive or non-invasive interven-
tions are (1) incapable of providing adequate relief,
(2) associated with excessive and intolerable acute or
chronic morbidity, and/or (3) unlikely to provide
relief within a tolerable time frame.”
According to these descriptions it is the patient who
determines when the suffering is intolerable, and the
physician (or other clinician) who determines whether a
symptom is refractory or not. However, it is not clear
why clinicians are in the best position to determine
whether or not a symptom is refractory, among other
things because it is questionable whether clinicians are
in a better position than the patient to determine
whether or not an intervention provides “adequate
relief”. This difficulty has been acknowledged in discus-
sions regarding intolerable suffering. For instance,
Thorns writes [10]:
“Suffering and distress are subjective symptoms and
so can only really be judged by the patient. It is
therefore debatable as to whether the patient or the
professional should decide when the symptoms
become refractory and whether all palliative treat-
ments need to have been “applied” or just “offered”.”
To be sure, the EAPC framework recognises the “sub-
jectivity of refractoriness” (p. 582) [4]. However, the
upshot of this is that regarding the vital question as to
when palliative sedation therapy is applicable, the EAPC
framework leaves the clinicians in the lurch: it is unclear
what symptoms are necessary and who the primary
party to determine this is: the patient or the clinician.
This problem is accentuated when it comes to so-
called psychological or existential suffering. As regards
physical or somatic symptoms, the most common
refractory symptoms are explicitly identified: “agitated
delirium, dyspnoea, pain and convulsions. Emergency
situations may include massive haemorrhage, asphyxia-
tion, severe terminal dyspnoea or overwhelming pain
crisis” (p. 584) [4]. However, refractory existential and
psychological distress as an indication for palliative
sedation therapy in the end of life is considered to be so
controversial as to merit “special guidelines” (p. 588) [4],
including repeated trials of intermittent therapy before
continuous therapy can even be considered.
The view that existential distress is a controversial
indication for palliative sedation therapy implies that
this kind of suffering is regarded as different from
somatic symptoms. Even though arguments in favour of
treating existential suffering as different from somatic or
physical (causes of) suffering are presented (p. 588) [4],
it is not self-evident that it should be treated differently.
In a text published on the EAPC homepage, regarding
decision-making, the concept of suffering is more thor-
oughly discussed. The authors write [11]:
“Sometimes a distinction is made between physical
and existential suffering, yet a case can be made that
all suffering is existential. Pain (or any other
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inevitably tied to each other, and suffering can exist
without physical symptoms.”
This can be taken as an argument in favour of not
treating somatic and existential suffering differently, or
to consider some existential suffering as a refractory
symptom itself, at least in the end of life. The EAPC
Ethics Task Force seems to hold such a view when
defining terminal sedation as the use of sedative medi-
cation to relieve intolerable suffering during the last
days of life (p. 98) [2]. This definition indicates that
intolerable suffering, regardless of what kind of suffering
we are dealing with, is sufficient for sedation. However,
in the article by de Graeff and Dean it is said that
“Palliative sedation therapy (PST) is the use of specific
sedative medications to relieve intolerable suffering from
refractory symptoms by a reduction in patient con-
sciousness” (p. 68) [3]. Obviously, this definition holds
refractory symptoms to be something other than mere
intolerable suffering, so existential intolerable suffering
in the end of life would, accordingly, be an insufficient
indication for palliative sedation. Thus, this definition
implies that if psychological/existential suffering were to
exist unaccompanied by refractory somatic symptoms,
then the criteria for PST would not be fulfilled and the
treatment not applicable.
As far as we can tell, the question of whether intoler-
able suffering is a sufficient or only a necessary precon-
dition for initiating palliative sedation is left unsolved in
the EAPC framework. The characterisation of refractori-
ness cited above indicates that it is only a necessary
condition, since it states that the intolerable symptoms
must be due to physical symptoms. However, the fact
that refractory existential and psychological distress is
addressed separately as “refractory” (p. 588) [4] seems to
indicate that it could be sufficient. What seems to be
lacking in the EAPC framework is the very thing you
expect from a guideline, namely a more thorough analy-
sis of intolerable suffering, refractory symptoms and the
relation between them: what are necessary and sufficient
criteria for palliative sedation at the end of life, and
why?
Intending death
In the EAPC framework, reference is made to the dis-
cussion regarding so-called “slow euthanasia” (p. 582)
[4]. This is described as occurring “when clinicians
sedate patients approaching the end of life with the pri-
mary goal of hastening the patient’s death” (p. 582) [4].
The perceived problem with slow euthanasia does not
seem to be the hastening of death in itself, since the
EAPC framework is careful to point out the risk of futile
treatments or insufficient palliative measures at the end
of life as a result of “exaggerated concerns about hasten-
ing death” (p. 582) [4]. Moreover, the EAPC readily
acknowledges that the proportional use of sedation (i.e.
the proportion needed to deal with symptoms and suf-
fering) could, in fact, on occasion, hasten death (p. 582)
[4]. The problem, rather, occurs when hastening the
patient’sd e a t hi s“the primary goal” of sedation. What
can be read out of this, we think, is that intending death
and using it as a means to relieve intolerable suffering is
considered unacceptable by the EAPC framework, since
doing so is equated with abuse. This relates to much-
debated issues regarding the (1) definition of palliative
sedation, (2) the difference between palliative sedation
and euthanasia, and (3) the moral relevance of goals or
intentions.
If we start with (1) and (2), the definitional difference
between palliative sedation in the end of life (including
continuous deep sedation) and euthanasia is often cast
in terms of intentions, very much as the EAPC frame-
work suggests. For instance, the EAPC Ethics task force
on palliative care and euthanasia stated in 2003 that the
intention of sedation is to relieve intolerable suffering by
using a sedating drug for symptom control, as opposed
to euthanasia, where the intention is to kill the patient
by administering a lethal drug [2].
According to these definitions, palliative sedation at
the end of life is clearly something other than euthana-
sia. However, the EAPC framework (as well as other
texts on this) fails to notice an ambiguity in the concept
of intention, the awareness of which makes the initial
impression of a vast moral difference between palliative
sedation and euthanasia fade somewhat. One way of
accounting for the intentions underlying actions is to
refer to the ultimate end for which something is done.
This is a neat way of accounting for the fact that the
intention of palliative sedation is not to shorten or ter-
minate patients’ lives: palliative sedation is done for the
sake of relieving symptoms and primarily intolerable suf-
fering of different kinds. However, the same thing can be
said about euthanasia for terminally ill patients: eutha-
nasia is to knowingly kill a person by the administration
of drugs, at that person’sv o l u n t a r ya n dc o m p e t e n t
request for the sake of relieving symptoms and primarily
intolerable suffering of different kinds. The ultimate end
of euthanasia is not to end the patient’sl i f e-i . e . ,t h a ti s
not the sake for which the administration of drugs is
done. Rather, the ultimate end is to relieve suffering by
other means than palliative sedation. Of course, there is
still the difference that euthanasia consists of knowingly
(and in this sense intentionally) terminating someone’s
life, while palliative sedation must not involve anything
of the kind. Since this ambiguity of the term intention is
not mentioned, the difference between palliative seda-
tion and euthanasia is made to look bigger than it really
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nasia by giving the impression that its ultimate aim is to
kill off the patient.
It might still be argued that there is something wrong
with intentionally (in the sense of knowingly) hastening
death that concerns the means used to achieve the ulti-
mate end of relief from unbearable suffering. The princi-
p l eo fd o u b l ee f f e c trules out actions with a good and a
bad effect where the bad effect is ‘directly intended’,b u t
permits such actions where the bad effect is not directly
intended but merely foreseen. The principle of double
effect could arguably be used as an ethical dividing line
that approves of palliative sedation but forbids euthana-
sia, since the latter but not the former directly intends
death (as a means to the good end of relieving the
patient of unbearable suffering). Accordingly, the princi-
ple relates to (3) above: it is a way of trying to justify
the moral relevance of intentionality.
However, there are controversies regarding both
whether or not palliative sedation in general and contin-
uous deep sedation in particular in the end of life actu-
ally fulfils the conditions of the principle of double
effect and whether or not it is a plausible principle at
all. There are those who argue that the principle can be
used as a dividing line between palliative sedation,
including deep continuous sedation until death, and
euthanasia [10,12]. However, there are those who claim
that neither euthanasia nor continuous deep sedation
satisfies the conditions of the principle of double effect
[13]. These authors argue that continuous deep sedation
at the end of life either means the irreversible loss of
consciousness or else hastens death, and furthermore
seem to presuppose that these effects are always unde-
sirable. However, there are also those who claim, by
arguing against these claims, that both euthanasia and
palliative sedation are compatible with the principle of
double effect. For instance, de Graeff and Dean argue
that the principle of double effect is not applicable to
palliative sedation, because correctly administered seda-
tion does not shorten life and “because the death of the
patient ... is not necessarily untoward” [3].
We are actually sympathetic towards the second of de
Graeff’s and Dean’s arguments: arguably, the principle of
double effect is not applicable to palliative sedation
when permanent loss of consciousness, which is the
result of continuous deep sedation until death, is not
‘untoward’ for patients. This would be the case when
unbearable suffering, as judged by the patient, is an una-
voidable consequence of being conscious and this goes
for the remainder of her existence. In such a case, it
could reasonably be maintained that even the perma-
nent loss of consciousness is not a bad effect of continu-
ous deep sedation till death. That is, unless permanent
loss of consciousness is bad for these patients in the
situation they are in, continuous deep sedation does not
seem to be an unacceptable means of eliminating their
unbearable suffering. However, if one accepts this line
of reasoning, the allegedly vast moral difference between
continuous deep sedation and euthanasia has yet to be
explained, since the same line of reasoning can be used
to defend euthanasia, at least if there is no morally rele-
vant difference between the permanent loss of con-
sciousness and death (which, we think, has been
forcefully argued elsewhere [14]). The same goes, of
course, if one rejects the ethical relevance of the princi-
ple altogether, as some authors do [15]. Note that noth-
ing of what we have been saying so far once and for all
demonstrates that there is no morally relevant difference
between continuous deep sedation and euthanasia. We
have only claimed that it remains unclear wherein the
difference lies and, more importantly, in what way this
difference can be accounted for in terms of intentions.
We think that the EAPC framework would have bene-
fited from taking a clearer stand in the discussion
regarding slow euthanasia. When, more specifically,
does palliative sedation at the end of life constitute
abuse? Whenever it hastens death (it would seem not,
as we understand it)? If it is intentionally hastening
death that is problematic, in what sense of intention?
And why is it, then, problematic? That is, according to
which principle(s) is it problematic and is this (these)
principle(s) reasonable?
Conclusions
In this text, we have argued that the EAPC framework
would have benefited from taking a clearer stand on the
ethically controversial issues regarding intolerable suffer-
ing and refractory symptoms and regarding the relation
between continuous deep palliative sedation at the end
of life and euthanasia. It is unclear what constitutes
refractory symptoms and what the relationship is
between refractory symptoms and intolerable suffering,
which in turn makes it difficult to determine what are
necessary and sufficient criteria for palliative sedation at
the end of life, and why. As regards the difference
between palliative sedation at the end of life and so-
called slow euthanasia, the rationale behind stressing the
difference is insufficiently demonstrated, at least partly
due to an overlooked ambiguity in the concept of inten-
tion. It is therefore unclear what kind of palliative seda-
tion at the end of life amounts to abuse and why. We
hope that an ensuing discussion will clarify EAPC’s
standpoint regarding these issues.
What we have been saying does not amount to con-
crete alternative recommendations. However, we hope
that we convey a message about the spirit in which we
would like to see frameworks on palliative sedation at
the end of life written: that the best interest and
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mary concerns. This is not to say that health care pro-
fessionals have no role in the decision-making regarding
palliative sedation at the end of life. They have a crucial
role since, for instance, only medical professionals can
determine what alternative treatments are available and
whether or not the patient is in a terminal stage of ill-
n e s s .R a t h e r ,t h ep o i n ti st h a ti tm u s tb em a d ec l e a r
when and why health care professionals should be
allowed to deny intolerably suffering patients at the end
of life continuous deep sedation with reference to symp-
toms not being refractory. In other words, if one cannot
say in what sense, when, and why intolerable suffering
or refractoriness of symptoms should be determined by
someone else than the patient, the patient’sj u d g e m e n t
on when suffering is intolerable and symptoms are
refractory should guide decision-making at the end of
life. And if one cannot say in what sense, when, and
why the intentions of health care professionals matter,
the best interest and autonomous decisions of the
patients override considerations about the possible
intentions of health care professionals.
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